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According to a labor force participation survey published in the mid-1980s, 
when men in rural Syria were asked whether their wives worked a large number of them 
replied that they did not. But when the question was rephrased as whether they will be 
forced to hire a replacement if their wives did not assist them in their work, the 
overwhelming number of them replied in affirmative. 255  This was just one striking 
example of the invisibility of Arab women in the workforce some two decade ago. We 
also find, for instance, that in Egypt, where women were thought to comprise 11 percent 
of the total labor force, samples of rural households in Lower Egypt revealed that half 
the wives plowed and leveled the land and between 55 and 70 percent were involved in 
agricultural production and 75 percent were engaged in animal husbandry.256  
Research by Sullivan had also uncovered a vast proportion of “invisible women” 
whose work was neither reflected in national statistics nor compensated in monetary 
terms, yet who worked, on average, longer hours than men.257 Most of these “invisible” 
women worked in agriculture or other family-run businesses, in the domestic economy, 
or elsewhere in the informal sector. The consequences of invisibility were serious; if the 
women were not even recognized as workers, they were certainly not going to be given 
access to the training, credit, and technology necessary for participating in the 
development process.258  
The present paper aims to examine the dynamic of Egyptian working women in 
historical perspective, including the influence of the state policy towards the 
empowerment of the women, the barriers for women to work in the private sector, and 
the attitude toward working women.  
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Egyptian Working Women in Historical Perspective 
Throughout the nineteenth century, vast majority of Egyptians remained a 
predominantly agrarian society living in the countryside and working their land for their 
own subsistence and for the revenue of the state.259 Agriculture sector played a crucial 
part in the live of the people and the country’s earning. When the face of the Egyptian 
country changes due to the introduction of new crops and technology, changes in land 
tenure pattern, intervention of the state, and integration into a world economy, the 
peasant family endured as the basic of social and economic unit, which was both 
producer and consumer.260  
Prior to the Muhammad Ali period, subsistence farming along with limited 
production peasant family dominated Egyptian agriculture, and the individual peasant 
family formed the basic unit of agricultural production.261 Although the peasant family 
certainly practiced a division of labor based on age and gender – women, for instance, 
did not plow but did work in the fields at harvest and pest-control time – women were 
very much part of a family productive unit.262 In addition to their work in agriculture, 
rural women also practiced a number of handicrafts and were particularly active in 
spinning. Many worked on their own account, using domestically produced or 
purchased wool, cotton, and flax, and then selling the finished yarn to weavers or 
middlemen. Thus women, as agricultural labors on the family plot or as craftswomen, 
played a critical and central role in the rural economy. 263  Not surprisingly, they 
sometimes owned agricultural implements and animals and, upon occasion, even 
managed to assert rights to the usufruct of agricultural land, as the records of the Islamic 
court testify.264 
Event of the Muhammad Ali period (1805-1849), especially from the 1820s on, 
had significant implications for rural women. As the demands of the European economy 
and the ambitions of the Egyptian state fostered increased commercialization of 
agriculture and consolidation of land, the state drafted peasant families for work on 
agricultural infrastructure and for the cultivation of large estates. Although the system 
of forced labor on public works (corvée) might recruit an entire family for a certain 
project, male were far more likely than females to be drafted. In addition, Muhammad 
Ali’s military reforms, which included the institution of the first peasant conscription, 
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siphoned off still more men.265 Both the forced labor and military recruitment resulted 
in the labor shortage and suffered the agricultural production in the countryside. What 
was left to till and harvest the land was chiefly women, children, the elder, and the 
infirm.266 This disruption of the family labor unit had a number of effects on women. 
Among others, women whose husbands, brothers, or sons had been drafted, either for 
the army or for regular labor, had to take on a crushing burden of work. Even after the 
heavy labor demands abated with the reversal of Muhammad Ali’s development 
projects, certain patterns had been set: men continued to be recruited for agricultural 
labor on the large estates while women were relegated to the shrinking family plot.267 
Integration into a world market also changed the local craft sector. Textile crafts 
were particularly hard hit by European exports of cloth that, over the course of the 
nineteenth century, decimated local textile production. The industrialization strategy of 
Muhammad Ali accelerated the erosion of local textile crafts: many women, who had 
worked as own-account spinners at home, were squeezed out the textile sector.268 
Although some of them were recruited to work in newly established factory, they were 
invariably restricted to the less-skilled support jobs, and their wages were appreciably 
lower than those of the men. After closure of most of the factories in the 1840s, textile 
crafts never recovered their former vitality, and most cotton and line cloth of daily wear 
were come to be imported.269 Nonetheless, a precedent had been set for the use of 
female labor in factories: when ginning mills and cigarette factories were established in 
the later part of the century, women were an important, albeit still lower-paid, part of 
the labor force.270 
As the pace of land consolidation and population growth quickened in the course 
of the nineteenth century, many rural women, along with their families, migrated to 
urban areas. Women migrants to urban areas were far more likely to gravitated toward 
an informal sector of the economy – petty trade and domestic service in particular.271 
The demand for servants accelerated as the wealthier households lost access to slave 
domestics with the outlawing of the slave trade and began to employ free women in 
greater numbers.  
Upper-class women held a more central position in the urban economy. As 
members of wealthy and powerful families, women were important holders of urban 
land. Fay’s study of sales and purchases of Egyptian urban women, waqf transactions, 
estate partitions, and merchant activities, as they were recorded in the various shari‘a 
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courts, arrive at similar conclusion: upper-class women owned considerable property, 
controlled large amounts of money, and managed some business themselves.272 The 
rights under Islamic law that women enjoyed to inheritance and the personal ownership 
of their mahr were also clearly more than a legal fiction. 
Although the women of the upper classes remained sheltered in the harem 
quarters of the great household, they still might participate in the economy. In fact, they 
did control property and conduct business affairs of various kinds. Using agents to 
conduct their business outside the confines of the harem, these women were especially 
active in business connected with the investment in important business venture, such as 
the lucrative long-distance trades.273 Upper-class women were clearly acknowledged as 
competent managers of common forms of property: as holders of iltizam (tax-farm) land 
and as managers of waqf property, they were entrusted with a significant proportion of 
both rural and urban productive property.274 
As the economic activities of the official and merchant elites altered 
significantly in the course of the nineteenth century, women of these classes shared in 
the shrinking fortune of their men folk. The decline in long-distance trade controlled by 
local merchants, as a result of growing European control of the import-export sector and 
the erosion of the waqf as the state grew more powerful, narrowed the field of economic 
opportunity for wealthy women. Still, the harem remained a place where elite women 
acquired skills of household and money management, laying the foundations for a 
smooth transition to expanded economic activities in the twentieth century.275 
In the nineteenth century, the ground was also sown for the later entry of women 
into the liberal professions. As early as the Muhammad Ali era, the government 
sponsored a school to educate women of harem in reading, writing, geography, and 
drawing.276 The drive for female education generated a demand for female teachers so 
that girls could lean in an all-female environment, therefore teaching was the first 
profession that not only was open to women, but also actively recruited them in order to 
meet the needs of a sex-segregated educational system.277  
Women economic activities were profoundly affected by nineteenth-century 
developments. The economic changes of the period did not necessarily spell 
improvement for women or raise their level of participation in the economy. Indeed, in 
the case of peasant women, where commercialization agriculture came to dominate, the 
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erosion of the family economy and the rise of wage labor could lead to their economic 
marginalization.278 Some women also lost their means of livelihood as the local textile 
industry faltered in the face of European competition. Certain crafts that employed 
women, however, probably expanded in the course of the century, and women were 
recruited to work in the light industries established in the nineteenth century. Overall, 
the sexual division of labor appeared to be remarkably fluid; women were often drawn 
into industries that had not previously been dependent on female labor. Although 
women were very much a part of the work force, they could expect to be remunerated at 
a rate far lower than that of men.279  
Government as a dominant employer for educated women 
After the 1952 Revolution, the state adopted a comprehensive strategy based on 
social justice and self-reliance for which full mobilization of human resources was a 
prerequisite. The new Constitution, which adopted a secular approach, granted equal 
opportunities to all citizens, regardless of gender, ethic origin or religion, to participate 
in realizing the goals of development.280 The revolutionary government made conscious 
efforts to promote women’s participation on the social, economic and political level. 
During the Nasser era, reforms provided free schooling and guaranteed work in the 
government bureaucracy upon gaining a degree, a policy that encouraged lower-class 
families to keep their children in school, with goal of secure employment in a 
government office.281 This policy proved particularly attractive for families of lower-
middle class, given the need for respectable employment which would not harm family 
honor, and ultimately created the overcrowding that now characterizes government 
offices. 
Young women of lower-middle-class working outside the home are generally 
the first in their families’ recent histories to pursue formal employment and their 
memories of the parameters of women’s lives become the key to constructions of 
women’s role, and the crucial market that separate their lives from those of older 
women.282 These women belong to families in which the parents are migrants to the 
city, coming from peasant villages and lacking formal education. The fathers of these 
families usually work as unskilled laborers, and often they are far away working as 
migrant laborers in the oil-rich states of the Middle East. Mothers work in the home, as 
housewives and by bringing resources to the family through constructing important 
networks of friends, relatives, and contacts. 283  Women are expected to contribute 
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through this channel, as well as through income-producing activities such as raising 
ducks, sewing for friends, and cooking for neighbors. Therefore, the change to 
daughters working in paid formal employment must be evaluated in the context of 
trade-offs of sources of income, prestige, and daily routines. Obtaining these jobs makes 
an immense difference to their families, for they leave the lower class based on the 
small but secure incomes and the higher prestige accorded by this office work. 
However, working outside the home for these group of women can be best 
termed ambivalent;284 while paid employment is considered as a major change which 
differentiates their lives from those of their mother’s generation, this change might not 
designated as progress. On the positive side, the obvious material benefit of earning 
income of their own is deemed important by these women. They go to work primarily 
because they and their families need the extra money, although socializing, keeping 
busy, the challenge, and finding husband are also among the reasons for valuing the 
work.285  These women value the ability to earn and are proud of their capacity to 
contribute to the family’s resources. Furthermore, earning their own salaries gives them 
and their children greater financial security, rather than relying on husbands who might 
keep some of their earnings for personal indulgences like coffee, films, and 
cigarettes.286 
As they work in the government bureaucracy, they benefit from protective labor 
laws, which bar discrimination on the basis of sex in hiring, benefits, and salary.287 
Additionally, their workplaces offer maternity leaves and often provide childcare. 
Women value the flexibility, shorter hours, and easier work these jobs offer when 
compared with alternative employment. Nevertheless, the salaries they earn are very 
low; they often earn less for the clerical tasks they perform than other workers earn in 
factories or in private firms.288 Because women’s income is still generally regarded as 
supplementing family incomes, low salaries are considered justifiable.  
Despite the low salaries they earn from working in the government offices, they 
still keep the job because to get these jobs they at least have to complete secondary 
school and often attended a higher school or college, where they studied commerce, 
secretarial skills, social work, or liberal arts. 289  Beside being underemployed, they 
seldom learn new skills at he office, where the work is usually repetitive and boring. To 
spend the tedious hour, they usually occupy it by chatting, since the work itself requires 
so little attention. Usually four or five women hold similar positions and can easily 
cover for one another while one slips out to shop, pray, run an errand, or go home to 
                                                             
284 Ibid., p. 54. 
285
 Ibid., p56 
286 Ibid., p. 60-61 
287 Ibid., p. 57.  
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid., p. 67 
  3147 
visit a sick relative.290 While the time to do these chores is useful, it is also clear that 
they are not doing truly necessary labor.  
Another reason for the women to keep their jobs in government bureaucracy is 
mobility. Traditionally, both men’s and women’s lives centered on the home and the 
neighborhood. In more recent years it has become increasingly common for men to go 
out of the neighborhood to work while women remained inside. While older women are 
limited to shopping at nearby markets accompanied by their children or occasionally to 
venturing out to visit relatives in other areas of the city, their working daughters’ lives 
provide new challenges and valued opportunities.291 For instance, each day women must 
commute, often long distances, to their offices. This traveling to and from work gives 
them a knowledge of the city they never had before; they gain the ability to master the 
bus systems, memorize the winding streets, and acquire the way that makes them more 
successful in dealing with the bureaucracy. On the other hand, they are also exposed to 
annoyances, out on the streets alone or in the company of female fellow workers, away 
from the protective family. Learning to deal with the annoyed situation they may have 
to face in the streets without the help of family members is crucial for maintaining their 
reputation. Typically, women cluster in groups on the buses and stroll arm in arm on the 
streets. They will walk far out into the street to avoid passing right in front of a sidewalk 
café and to show that they are not loose women, but moral ones. While the necessity of 
avoiding such is annoying, the ability to take care of themselves becomes a source of 
great pride and self-respect for them.292 
However, a woman’s labor in the workplace is largely unappreciated, while her 
work in the home is highly valued. The work these women do at the office is regarded 
as simple and boring, unchallenging and unimportant, while the work they do at home is 
considered challenging and important. 293  Indeed, in a culture where family and 
household are the centers of economic, political, and social activities, it is quite 
reasonable that work done at the government offices would be seen as less useful than 
that accomplished in the home. As the government bureaucracy has become more and 
more bloated, the prestige of these jobs has suffered along with the salaries.294 The final 
result is a devalued workplace and sense of personal accomplishment. 
At the juncture of workplace and household women face the issue of the 
political atmosphere each embodies. Working involves women’s moving from the 
sphere of the household into the workplace; moving from home life in which women are 
very much in charge to the bureaucratic atmosphere of the office. For Egyptian families, 
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home life has many public aspects; women involved in organizing the economic and 
social resources of a large family. They prepare the budgets, purchase, and weddings, 
and help in the children’s education.295 Family life is firmly tied into informal network 
of larger economic, social, and political importance. In the workplace, most women 
hold low-ranking jobs where they follow orders rather than organize and instruct 
themselves.296 As they transfer their time and attention from home to workplace, they 
lost their informal power. However, women tolerated diminished authority in part 
because this loss is counterbalanced by an increased ability to earn and to provide.297  
In 1974, four years after coming to power, Sadat adopted the economic “Open 
Door Policy” and encouraged the private sector to increase the productive capacity of 
the economy. This policy resulted mostly in the growth in external commercial 
activities with no investment in productive sectors.298 Begun as a guarantee to publicly 
employ all university graduates, it was extended to vocational secondary school and 
technical institute (two-year post secondary institutions) graduates and the policy was 
formalized in Law No. 14 of 1964. It was later made permanent in Law No. 85 of 
1973.299 The graduate employment guarantee has had major implications for the size 
and composition of the public sector workforce in Egypt. As a result of the graduate 
employment guarantee scheme, Egypt has one of the highest proportions of total 
employment in the civil service in the world.300 
Historically, government policies have had a major role in changing gender 
norms about women’s employment outside the home. Applied equally to male and 
female graduates, the graduate employment guarantee has resulted in large numbers of 
women joining the public sector workforce. Consequently, employment outside the 
home is now part of the normal expectations of young women who achieve a secondary 
level of education. This is clearly apparent when one examines the pattern of female 
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labor force participation by educational attainment, where there is a sudden and large 
increase at the secondary education level, the point at which graduates become eligible 
for the employment guarantee. 301  Besides making paid employment the norm for 
educated females, the employment guarantee scheme has also helped shape what is 
deemed female-appropriate employment. Public sector work is strongly preferred by 
female workers because it has other important characteristics that make it gender 
appropriate. These characteristics include generous medical and retirement benefits, 
relatively short work hours (six hours a day and six days per week is the public sector 
norm in Egypt), low effort requirement, and the presence of a large number of other 
women in the workplace, providing a measure of sexual safety. With the inevitable 
slowdown in public sector employment, its role in “normalizing” female employment 
outside the home might see a significant reversal. 302  Although a relatively small 
proportion of Egyptian women work for pay in the private sector, few remain in that 
sector after marriage and many would rather queue for years for a public sector job 
rather than take one in the private sector. 
However, the economic logic for married women being employed in the 
government sector has been eroded. When women work away from the home, the cost 
to the household in terms of both finance and convenience has become so high that in 
many cases employment is no longer a viable option. Their expenses included the cost 
of clothing in conformity with middle class expectations, which is considerable in 
Egypt, transport, and miscellaneous items. The household budget suffers considerably 
because women do not have the time to shop efficiently. Childcare and nursery 
expenses are a further cost; even when female kin help, the service they do as a favor is 
often expected to be repaid in the form of gifts. As a result of all these factors, more and 
more men are demanding that their wives give up their jobs and stay at home.303 
Although men often justify such a demand primarily on the grounds of cost-
effectiveness, there are often other unvoiced desires for reinstating or reinforcing their 
own position as breadwinner.  
Although Sadat’s regime was not against women’s equality in principle, the new 
economic order had less need for women’s participation. As the government gradually 
withdrew its commitment to guarantee employment to all graduates, unemployment 
among school graduates rose rapidly. The expectation that women would enter the 
workplace thus became a burden on the state rather than an asset. With the decline of 
work opportunities in the formal sector, women are increasingly participating in the 
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informal sector. However, they work under no social or legal protection. Their work is 
not included in formal statistics, and they received no support service.  
The national view of women’s work also seemed to shift, and the definition of 
women as playing primarily a domestic role gain ground. Justifying ideologies based on 
sexual division of roles began to appear, supported by the newly emerging Islamic 
fundamentalist ideology which is based on the central role of the family and put 
emphasize on women’s private role to the detriment of their public role. Some passage 
from the Qur’an were taken out of context and reinterpreted in a misogynistic way to 
justify male supremacy. The impact of these interpretations was made possible by 
adding a qualifying provision to Article 11 of the 1971 Constitution which declared the 
state’s commitment to help reconciling women’s family obligations and their equality to 
men in the public sphere. The addition held, “provided that this did not infringe on the 
rules of Islamic Shari‘a.” Thus, the new Constitution created opportunity for Islamic 
groups to oppose women’s rights to work outside their household.304  
 
Barriers to Private Sector Employment for Women 
The access to public sector employment for young women was also reduced 
because older women were staying longer on government payrolls, and this reduction is 
not being counteracted by increased access in the private sector. In fact, although 
private sector wage employment was primarily the domain of young women in their 
twenties and early thirties, access to it had not increased from time to time. There seems 
therefore to be some support for Moghadam’s contention that structural adjustment is 
crowding women out of the Egyptian labor market by reducing access to public 
employment without affecting the barriers to entry women face in the private sector.305 
The problem is not one of general lack of dynamism in the private sector. Wage 
employment in the private non-agricultural sector was the second-fastest growing 
segment of the labor market after government. It grew at an average of 4.3 percent per 
year from 1988 to 1998, a rate that is 72 percent higher than the 2.5 percent overall 
employment growth rate in that period. However, the growth of employment in that 
sector was much more rapid for males (4.7 percent per year) than for females (1.6 
percent per year), despite the fact that overall female employment growth was more 
rapid than that of males. Given the almost certain prospects of a slowdown in the 
growth of public sector employment in Egypt, the barriers to female employment in the 
private sector may lead to continued high unemployment rates for women and a 
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possible reversal in the growth of female labor force participation observed in recent 
years. Thus, it appears that the growth of the female labor force in Egypt in the 
foreseeable future will be more constrained by factors related to labor demand and labor 
market structure than to labor supply.306 
Women’s paid employment in the private sector is one area in which the 
prevalent social norms interact with government policies in powerful ways. The 
availability of government employment for female graduates has done a lot to attenuate 
strong social norms that discourage women’s employment outside the home. What 
government employment has also done, however, is define what is a gender-appropriate 
job in Egypt. If private sector work does not fit into that category, it is virtually closed 
to women, both because employers do not consider them worthy candidates for such 
jobs and because the women and their families do not consider it suitable employment. 
Moghadam argues that excessive regulation, and in particular female-specific 
mandates, such as paid and unpaid maternity leaves and child care provisions, 
discourage private employers from hiring women. 307  This argument appears to be 
somewhat exaggerated, however, given that the Egyptian government has been very lax 
about enforcing its own labor laws. One can safely assume that jobs that are not 
protected by a contract will not provide all the female-specific benefits that the law 
stipulates. 308 
The main reason Egyptian employers are reluctant to hire women has been 
associated with the widespread perception that women have a low attachment to the 
workforce. This perception manifests itself in several ways, including a sense that 
female workers have a high turnover rate, which makes them poor prospects for 
training, that they have high absenteeism rates, and that they are unwilling to work the 
long hours that the private sector in Egypt requires. Such low commitment to the 
workforce is a direct outcome of social norms that make the home women’s primary 
domain of responsibility. Although this applies to both married and unmarried women, 
the situation for married women is compounded to an extent that private sector wage 
work is seen as totally incompatible with marriage, leading to a virtual certainty of 
quitting such work at marriage. All these factors lead to the reluctance of private sector 
employers to hire female workers, gender wage differentials are fully consistent with 
such a hypothesis. Besides employers’ reluctance to hire them, women face other sorts 
of constraints in the private labor market. Women tend to prefer working in relatively 
                                                             
306
 Ibid. 
307 Ibid, p. 119. 
308 Labor Law 91 of 1954 made special provisions for married women and mothers. Later, under 
Sadat, these provisions were expanded to facilitate women’s labor market participation. This law was 
applied primarily in the public and government sectors, which made jobs in these areas particularly 
attractive to women. As a result the state has become the single most important employment of 
women. See Earl L. Sullivan, 1981, p. 10. 
  3152 
large establishments with many other female workers in them because of the protection 
against sexual harassment that the presence of other women provides.  
Women are also more geographically constrained than men. Their place of 
residence is generally determined by either parents or husbands, so that they cannot 
adjust where they live to where the jobs are.309 Moreover, they are less able to commute 
long distances to work because of time constraints and safety concerns. Men working in 
the private sector in Egypt have to commute significantly more to get to private sector 
jobs. Women’s inability to make such commutes limits them to jobs that are locally 
available, and therefore is likely to be an important entry barrier to women in the private 
sector. 
In the final analysis it could safely be said that the rapid increase in the female 
labor is mostly due to economic necessity, rather than changing social attitude. And, in 
fact, both society as a whole and the working women themselves are developing a more 
conservative attitude towards women’s work by considering women’s domestic role as 
their natural and main role. 
 
Conclusion 
 The changes in women’s economic participation have varied by class. Among 
the rural and urban lower class, capitalist development seems to have restricted and 
devalued women’s work by demarcating the home from the workplace and defining 
appropriate women’s work as work at home. Economic need, however, whether 
produced by rapid industrialization or male labor shortages, could pull women into the 
modern labor force whenever they were needed.  
Working seems an ambivalent step for the lower-middle-class women rather 
than an example of completely progressive change. This ambivalence is particularly 
unsettling as they had extremely high expectation for leaving the home to work and its 
potential benefit for their lives. Their families often sacrificed considerably to enable 
them to stay in school, and women expect their jobs to bring them financial security, 
challenging tasks, new social contacts, and especially, firm middle-class status. Many of 
these expectations have not been met. Yet despite this ambivalence, this group of 
women valued their works as giving them opportunity to explore outside the realm of 
the home, and especially the mobility. 
 Being at the interface of the division between the household and the labor 
market, women see a significant change in their roles as development proceeds. Rising 
educational attainment among women further reinforces a significant association 
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between educational attainment and work outside the home. These powerful forces are 
counteracted by the strong social norms that are much slower to change. 
Gender norms about the primacy of women’s reproductive role and the sexual 
division of labor constrain women’s geographical mobility. Women tend to be 
disproportionately concentrated in the public sector, partly because public sector jobs 
tend to be more compatible with women’s household responsibilities than paid 
employment in the private sector, and partly because public sector employers are less 
able to discriminate against women. 
The Nasser era reforms were designed in part to encourage social mobility 
through education and work in the government bureaucracy. However, the result has 
been an enormous swelling of the government bureaucracy. Not surprising, as the status 
of these jobs has fallen, lower- and lower-middle class men often migrate to other 
nations or perform blue-collar work, which pays better. Women, however, remain in the 
government ranks, as alternatives such as factory labor are considered unsuitable. 
Finally, with the slowdown in government hiring in recent years and judging by 
the high number of female graduates seeking paid employment, the expectations of 
work remain. However, the opportunities to work are becoming increasingly limited due 
to the presence of significant barriers to female employment in the private sector. 
Unless these barriers can be reduced in the near future, the gains achieved from 
significant increases in female participation in the labor market are liable to be reversed. 
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